Smallpox, a highly contagious and deadly viral disease, has a long and dark history that can be traced back to ancient times. The disease is caused the variola virus, which primarily spreads through respiratory droplets. Smallpox is characterized the development of a distinct rash, high fever, and flu-like symptoms. While smallpox has been eradicated globally through an extensive vaccination campaign led the World Health Organization (WHO), there are still certain precautions and concerns surrounding the virus. In this comprehensive guide, we will delve into the topic of “Is There Still Smallpox in the World?
” and explore various aspects related to the eradication, laboratory storage, potential risks, and ongoing research related to smallpox.
Smallpox, once a widespread and devastating disease, was officially declared eradicated in 1980. This monumental achievement was made possible due to a worldwide vaccination campaign led the WHO, with the last natural occurring case of smallpox documented in Somalia in 1977. The successful eradication of smallpox makes it the first and only human disease to be eradicated. Despite this, concerns regarding the remaining stocks of the variola virus in laboratory settings persist.
In order to promote both scientific research and protect society from potential risks associated with smallpox, two official repositories maintain stocks of the live variola virus. These repositories are the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in the United States and the State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology (VECTOR Institute) in Russia. These two institutions hold the only authorized stocks of smallpox virus, with all other known samples being transferred to these institutions or destroyed.
The decision to retain live stocks of the smallpox virus has been a subject of significant debate in recent years. Proponents argue that the samples are crucial for further research, vaccine development, and potential treatment options. However, opponents raise concerns about the safety and security risks associated with housing the virus. The accidental release of smallpox or the deliberate malevolent use of the virus are acknowledged risks that demand strict protective measures and robust security protocols.
Both the CDC and VECTOR Institute laboratories adhere to the highest biosafety levels (BSL-4) to ensure maximum containment of the smallpox virus. These facilities have stringent security measures, regular inspections, and protocols in place to prevent accidental dissemination. It is important to note that these laboratories are not the only ones conducting research on smallpox-related topics. Many other laboratories worldwide study surrogate viruses or employ molecular techniques to understand the biology and characteristics of the variola virus without actually working with the live virus.
Additionally, the WHO oversees the management and regulation of the smallpox repositories, ensuring transparency, accountability, and adherence to international standards of biosafety and biosecurity. The WHO periodically assesses the necessity of maintaining live stocks and assesses the progress made in research efforts to justify the retention of the virus.
The global commitment to the complete eradication of smallpox has not wavered, and there are ongoing efforts to prevent re-emergence or accidental release of the virus. One fundamental aspect of this commitment is the requirement for all countries to report any suspected or confirmed cases of smallpox to the WHO. A robust surveillance system is in place to detect any potential outbreak swiftly, allowing for immediate response and containment measures.
Furthermore, the availability of effective vaccines against smallpox has significantly contributed to its eradication. The smallpox vaccine, which contains a live, attenuated virus related to the variola virus, provides long-lasting immunity against smallpox. Vaccination played a crucial role in interrupting the chain of transmission and reducing the number of susceptible individuals, ultimately leading to the eradication of smallpox.
While the smallpox vaccine is no longer routinely administered due to the absence of natural transmission, certain populations are still at risk of exposure. For instance, laboratory workers who handle the live smallpox virus, individuals working with the closely related monkeypox virus, and military personnel deployed to regions where the virus may be used as a bioweapon may require vaccination to protect against potential exposure.
Despite the eradication of smallpox and the significant containment measures in place, concerns regarding the threat of smallpox re-emergence through laboratory accidents or deliberate actions persist. The risk of accidental release from the repositories is an ongoing concern, albeit minimal due to the stringent safety measures in place. Similarly, the intentional use of smallpox as a biological weapon poses a potential threat, leading to rigorous biosurveillance and security protocols worldwide.
To counteract these potential risks, extensive research efforts are ongoing to develop new antiviral drugs and improved vaccines against smallpox. These novel interventions aim to enhance preparedness, improve treatment options, and provide additional protection strategies against any potential smallpox outbreak. Researchers are focused on targeting various aspects of the virus’s lifecycle, including its replication, entry into host cells, and immune evasion mechanisms.
Moreover, advancements in molecular biology techniques have allowed scientists to study the genetic makeup of the smallpox virus. Comparative genomics and analysis have provided valuable insights into the evolution, origins, and potential vulnerabilities of the virus. Such research is critical for the development of diagnostic tools, antiviral therapies, and improved vaccines.
Smallpox has been successfully eradicated, and there are no documented cases of natural smallpox transmission anywhere in the world since 1977. However, the live variola virus stocks are securely maintained in authorized repositories and utilized for research purposes. Strict safety protocols and containment measures in the laboratories housing live smallpox virus stocks ensure that accidental releases are highly unlikely. Concurrently, efforts are ongoing to advance research, develop novel interventions, and improve preparedness against any potential re-emergence or threat associated with smallpox. The global commitment to eradication and stringent protocols implemented the WHO and authorized repositories remain essential in maintaining safety, security, and vigilance in the post-eradication era of smallpox.